Chinese officials and delegates at the 60th anniversary of the Tibet Autonomous Region in Lhasa, 20 August 2025
On 20 August, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, arrived in Lhasa, capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), to lead a central government delegation marking the 60th anniversary of the TAR’s establishment.
Chinese state media portrayed the visit as an unprecedented gesture of “care and affection” for Tibetans, while official documents stressed Xi’s participation in ceremonial activities and his review of the work of the TAR Party Committee and the regional government. Beijing’s narrative framed the past six decades of so-called “regional ethnic autonomy” as a period of prosperity, stability, and development for Tibet.
Beneath this orchestrated spectacle, the anniversary was less about genuine autonomy than about consolidating Beijing’s control and advancing assimilationist policies. Far from enjoying self-determination, Tibetans remain politically marginalized, their cultural and religious practices tightly restricted, and increasingly subjected to systemic Sinicization campaigns.
During his visit to Lhasa, Xi Jinping presided over work reports from the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Committee and Government. He reiterated Beijing’s long-standing priorities of “political stability,” “ethnic unity,” “religious harmony,” and the creation of a “national model zone for ethnic unity and progress.” Xi emphasized the need to strengthen the collective consciousness of the Chinese nation by advancing nation-building efforts and intensifying education on the Party’s history, the history of New China, reform and opening up, socialist development, and the broader historical trajectory of the Chinese nation.
Celebration of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region, September 2005
In contrast to speeches at previous anniversaries, like the 40th anniversary in 2005, in which leaders at least mentioned deepening regional autonomy, Xi and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Wang Huning were silent about any mention of autonomy. Their remarks made clear that Tibet’s future is framed within the CCP’s project of homogenizing ethnic identities into a single Zhonghua Minzu (Chinese nation). This omission exposes Beijing’s complete abandonment of even the limited promises enshrined in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law that guarantees minority regions the right to protect their language, culture, and local governance. In reality, these rights have been gutted.
This erosion is clear in the composition of Tibet’s governing bodies. In the current People’s Government of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Tibetans hold only three of the 13 top positions, including the Chairman, Vice Chairmen, and Secretary-General. The remaining ten posts more than 70 percent of the leadership are occupied by Han Chinese officials. A similar pattern is evident in the CPC Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee, the region’s highest decision-making body, where 8 of the 14 Standing Committee members are Han Chinese, including the Party Secretary, who holds the greatest authority. The Standing Committee of the 12th People’s Congress of the Tibet Autonomous Region also reflects this imbalance: among its members, there are 4 Tibetans out of 8 Han Chinese officials. In its leadership, the Chair is Han Chinese, while a majority of the Vice-Chairpersons are also Han Chinese. This dominance extends to county-level administrations as well. For instance, in Jomda County, Chamdo Prefecture, out of one senior and ten junior officials, six are Chinese and four are Tibetan, with the county head also being Chinese. Tibetan officials serve largely symbolic roles while strategic decision-making remains firmly in the hands of Beijing’s appointees.
Alongside the erosion of political authority is the systematic dismantling of Tibetan language and culture. The CCP’s emphasis on ‘ethnic unity” masks a systematic policy of cultural erasure. Tibetan medium schools are steadily dismantled, with Mandarin imposed as the primary language of instruction, even in rural and monastic schools. Even monastic schools, long custodians of language and heritage, are compelled to replace Tibetan with Mandarin and to teach Party ideology as a core subject. Parents increasingly report that their children can no longer communicate fluently with grandparents, as the state education system punishes the use of Tibetan. This steady downgrading of Tibetan as a living language is central to the CCP’s effort to reshape identity from childhood.
Monasteries and nunneries are required to hold weekly political education sessions in which CCP history is given greater weight than Buddhist teachings. Images of the Dalai Lama are banned and replaced by portraits of Xi Jinping or other Party leaders. Religious texts are translated into Mandarin, stripping away the cultural resonance, and festivals once central to Tibetan communal life are curtailed or outright banned.
Policies of assimilation extend beyond language and religion into the very fabric of social life. State campaigns encourage intermarriage between Tibetans and Han Chinese, while labor transfer programs send Tibetan graduates to work in Chinese provinces and bring large numbers of Han professionals and workers into Tibet. Major hydropower and mining projects displace Tibetan communities, often without consultation or adequate compensation. Resistance to these relocations has been met with arrests and detentions as documented by the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD). In the name of development, Tibetans lose both land and heritage while Beijing consolidates demographic and economic control.
Behind the slogans of “ethnic unity,” the CCP has intensified restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, religion, and cultural rights. The emphasis on “stability maintenance” (weiwen) is used to justify surveillance and coercion of Tibetans, severe restrictions on religious practice and language use, and assimilationist policies designed to erode Tibetan identity. Recent internal directives suggest that these measures are being reinforced through heightened security vigilance. An internal Chengdu cybersecurity document warns of increased activity by “Tibetan independence” and anti-China groups in 2025, particularly around sensitive dates such as the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region on 9 September. It urges vigilance against online and offline dissemination of pro-Dalai Lama or separatist content, the risk of illegal religious gatherings or extreme incidents, and potential attempts to discredit China’s ethnic and religious policies as well as its development achievements in Tibet.
The 60th anniversary of the Tibet Autonomous Region was not a celebration of autonomy but a tightly choreographed demonstration of Beijing’s authority. Rather than delivering the promised benefits of ethnic self-governance, the system continues to deny Tibetans meaningful representation, suppress cultural and religious expression, and enforce political conformity in the name of “unity.” The commemorations served less to honour Tibetan rights than to showcase state dominance and to justify ongoing repression under the rhetoric of “ethnic unity” and “national progress.”
