On 1 December 2024, China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs, the highest official body that regulates all recognised religions in China issued a revised version of the “Measures for the Administration of Tibetan Buddhist Temples.” Adopted in September 2024 and came into force on 1 January 2025, the new regulation significantly expanded state control over Tibetan religious practice by embedding political mandates into Tibetan religious administration.
A major revision in Article 4 explicitly binds Tibetan monasteries to the ideological framework of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The revised provision states:
“Temples and clergy should love the motherland, support the leadership of the Communist Party of China, support the socialist system, abide by the Constitution, laws, regulations, rules, and relevant provisions on the management of religious affairs, practice core socialist values, forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation, adhere to the direction of the Sinicization of religion, uphold the principle of independence and self-management, safeguard national unity, ethnic unity, religious harmony, and social stability, and promote the adaptation of Tibetan Buddhism to socialist society.”
This revision introduces explicit political conditions that further intertwine religious practice with state ideology. By enshrining such requirements into law, the CCP intensifies its grip on monasteries and clergy, effectively making political loyalty a legal obligation. For instance, the directive to “forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation” implicitly pressures Tibetan Buddhists to assimilate their distinct culture and identity into the dominant Han Chinese framework. This reinforces China’s broader systematic policy of cultural assimilation and aligns with the CCP’s overarching goal to Sinicize religion.
Another significant addition appears in Article 10, which governs the qualification of monastic administrators. The first condition mandates:
“Love for the motherland and protection of the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system.”
While such language is commonplace in Chinese political discourse, its inclusion in religious regulations marks a sharp escalation of state intervention in religious governance. This clause makes allegiance to the CCP a mandatory qualification for religious administrators, reinforcing political oversight of monastic leadership.
Article 11 further expands the responsibilities of monastic administrators, compelling them to conduct political education for monks. This reflects President Xi Jinping’s ideological directives on religion and ethnicity, institutionalizing political indoctrination within monastic communities.
Article 15 imposes strict quotas on monastic populations and grants the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) a prominent role in Sinicizing Tibetan Buddhism. In recent years, the BAC has functioned as a tool for implementing Sinicization campaigns and advancing the CCP’s political agenda.
“Temples shall determine the fixed seats based on their capacity to accommodate and their economic capabilities. The temple management organization shall apply to the local Buddhist association and submit material to prove that the temple has the corresponding capacity. After the Buddhist Association reviews and agrees, it shall be reported to the county-level religious affairs department, which shall then report it to the provincial-level religious affairs department for filing.”
Similarly, Article 30 introduces a cumbersome multi-tiered approval process for monks and nuns seeking to study under a teacher from another monastery. The procedure includes:
- Submitting a written application to the temple management.
- Approval from the township government and the local Buddhist Association.
- Review and certification by county-level religious affairs departments.
- Registration with the hosting temple.
- Final approval from the local Buddhist Association and government offices.
These excessive bureaucratic steps function as a de facto restriction on monastic education, discouraging mobility and limiting access to religious teachings outside state-approved structures.
The revised Measures for the Administration of Tibetan Buddhist Temples systematically enforce the Chinese Communist Party’s ideological control over Tibetan Buddhism by embedding political loyalty requirements into religious administration. These measures are part of the broader state efforts to assimilate Tibetan religious and cultural identity into the dominant Han identity, undermining China’s own legal guarantees—particularly Article 36 of the Constitution, which explicitly provides citizens the right to freedom of religious belief, and Article 11 of the Regional National Autonomy Law.
“The Chinese government has significantly escalated its suppression of religious freedom in Tibet in the last decade,” said Dawa Tashi, researcher at TCHRD. “Through coercive ‘patriotic education’ campaigns designed to instill loyalty, strict control over monastic institutions, and widespread arbitrary arrests and detentions, authorities have tightened their grip. Today, religion in Tibet is not just regulated—it is ruled with an iron fist.”